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艰难驾驭Tangled reins

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Tangled reins
艰难驾驭
Sep 6th 2007
From The Economist print edition

America's central bank attempts to tame a beast it once let loose
美国央行试图驯服自己放出来的野兽

点击图片可在新窗口打开

COWBOY culture might not seem an obvious source of inspiration for central bankers. But during their recent gathering in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the world's monetary-policy elite watched a new-age cowboy saddle an unbroken horse, calming the anxious animal with soft words and a gentle touch. The techniques of horse whispering, he claimed, could be used to build trust and confidence in all walks of life. “What about the commercial-paper market?” one onlooker quipped.
牛仔文化可能并非中央银行行长的灵感之源. 但最近在的怀俄明州Jackson Hole会议中, 这个世界货币政策精英目睹一位新时期牛仔给一匹烈马上鞍, 使用温言软语令那焦躁不安的畜生安静下来. 他宣称这种马语术可以被用以在社会各界建立信任和信心. “那商业票据市场呢?” 一位旁观者揶揄道.

Confidence is exactly what financial markets need right now, and Federal Reserve officials are grasping for their own version of the horse whisperers' magic. In an eagerly awaited speech at Jackson Hole, Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, did his statesmanlike best to exude confidence, reiterating that although the central bank should not protect lenders and investors “from the consequences of their financial decisions”, it would act “as needed” to limit damage to the broader economy. But the exact implication of his remarks for interest rates was left unspecified.
信心正是当前金融市场亟需之物, 而美联储官员们正在悟出他们自己的马语术. 在万众翘首以待的Jackson Hole讲话上, 美联储主席本•伯南克使出浑身的政治家解数来散布信心, 重申尽管央行不应该为贷款者和投资者 ”自身行为导致的后果” 擦屁股, 但央行还是会”根据需要”采取行动降低对更大范围经济的破坏. 但他对利率政策的具体方案仍语焉不详.

A more detailed insight came from Frederic Mishkin*, a Fed governor who, along with Mr Bernanke himself, is one of the most accomplished monetary experts on the central bank's interest-rate setting committee. Mr Mishkin exuded confidence too, but not of the horse-whispering sort. Instead, he ran through simulations on the mortgage implosion and insisted that the Fed could contain the fallout. His numbers suggested that, even if house prices were to fall by 20% in real terms over the next two years, and even if the links between house prices and spending proved to be stronger than the central bank ordinarily assumes, the consequences would be manageable. The economy's growth would never be dragged down by more than half a percentage point, while the unemployment rate would rise by only 0.2 of a percentage point.
一项更深入的分析来自美联储总裁佛雷德里希•米什金, 他和伯南克先生一样, 都是美联储利率制定委员会最资深的货币专家之一. 米什金先生也在散布信心, 但并非马语术. 他模拟了抵押贷款危机的爆发, 坚持认为美联储有能力抵御其不良后果. 他的数据表明, 即使房价在接下来的两年内下跌20%, 且房价与支出之间的联系比央行常规估计的更密切, 其后果仍然是可以控制的. 经济增长率绝对不会下跌超过0.5个百分点, 而失业率仅仅会上升0.2个百分点.

Reassuring stuff—except Mr Mishkin's rosy figures assume that central bankers can quickly and pre-emptively loosen monetary policy. The big relief, in Mr Mishkin's view, is that falling house prices translate only slowly into lower spending, so central bankers can soften even sharp house-price declines provided that they cut interest rates early. His paper suggests, for instance, that if house prices were to fall by a fifth, short-term interest rates might need to be cut by some 1.75 percentage points over the next year or so.
乐观的看法—除了米什金先生的乐观数字认为中央银行能够迅速且前瞻性地放松银根. 在米什金先生看来, 人们深信不疑地认为房价的下降只会缓慢地使降低支出, 因此只要早一步降息, 哪怕房价发生暴跌央行也能从容应付. 比如, 他的文章指出, 如果房价下降五分之一, 下一年度短期利率大约需要降低1.75个百分点.

In other words, Mr Mishkin suggests the Fed should cut interest rates before a deflating housing bubble affects the real economy, even though it resisted acting before an inflating bubble created dangerous economic distortions. That sounds suspiciously like the Fed's position before and after the stock market bust: sit back as the bubble grows, but react aggressively in the aftermath—and never mind criticism that the low interest rates of a few years ago helped to stoke the housing bubble.
换言之, 米什金先生认为, 美联储应该在消失的房产泡沫影响实体经济之前降息, 尽管它曾经拒绝在膨胀的泡沫产生危险的经济扭曲之前采取行动. 这听起来和美联储在股票市场崩盘前后的立场离奇地相似: 坐视泡沫产生, 却在事后反应过度—并且毫不在意人们批评其前些年的低利率政策助长了房地产泡沫.

Mr Mishkin did not deny that those cuts inflated house prices. Quite the opposite. His study described the many channels through which housing transmits changes in monetary policy into the broader economy. A lower cost of capital, for instance, fuels the pace of construction. Lower interest rates boost house prices which in turn encourage people to spend more by making them feel wealthier and giving them more scope to borrow. The Fed's basic model suggests that about 14% of the impact of any interest-rate change on the economy is transmitted via housing markets. Because credit markets have grown more sophisticated, the impact could be as high as 25%.
米什金先生从未否认那几次降息行动导致了房价膨胀. 正好相反, 他的研究描述了许多反应渠道, 房地产市场通过它们将货币政策的变化传递到更大范围的经济中. 比如, 更低的资本成本加快了建设速度. 更低的利率提高了房价, 这使人们觉得自己变富且借钱变得更容易, 从而更猛地花钱. 美联储的基础模型表明的利率政策变动对经济的冲击大约有14%通过房地产市场来传递. 随着信贷市场变得越来越复杂, 这一冲击可能增加到25%.

Mr Mishkin also acknowledged that housing booms and busts could contribute to financial instability, which could “magnify problems for the overall economy.” As documented in his paper, the subprime mess was preceded by a lending bonanza and a weakening of credit standards. Yet, for all that, Mr Mishkin stuck to the Fed's line that it should not have tried to restrain house prices with higher interest rates. He repeated the standard arguments for why central bankers should not target house prices: that bubbles can be identified only after the fact, and that pricking them with higher interest rates might do more harm than good.
米什金先生亦承认, 房地产市场的暴涨与崩溃”放大了整个经济的问题”, 是金融不稳定的原因. 正如其文章中所提到的, 在刺激贷款危机之前的现象是泛滥的贷款和越来越低的信贷标准. 尽管如此, 米什金先生仍然站在美联储一边, 认为不应该试图以升息方式遏制房价. 他重申央行不应以房价为目标的标准理由: 泡沫只有在事后才能被确认, 且通过升息来刺破泡沫得不偿失.

Shooting at the sheriff
炮轰美联储
This is by now an old debate. A minority of central bankers (mainly in Europe) and many observers (including The Economist) have long argued that the Fed should try harder to prevent bubbles. The new twist at this year's gathering was that the critics' ranks seemed to be deepening. John Taylor, a Stanford University professor and author of the “Taylor Rule” for setting interest rates, argued that the Fed had erred by keeping rates too low for too long. Had the central bank followed his rule, he argued, it would have raised the Federal funds rate from 1.75% in 2001 to 5.25% by mid-2005, rather than pushing it down to 1% and then raising it only slowly. Professor Taylor's calculations showed that a more orthodox path for interest rates would have dramatically reduced the pace of home building. Earlier tightening, he argued, would have “avoided much of the housing boom”. Central bankers from Israel to Brazil spoke up in favour of discouraging bubbles and questioned the Fed's approach.
争论由来已久. 少数中央银行(主要是欧洲)和许多旁观者(包括<经济学人>)早就指出, 美联储应该在防止泡沫方面做的更多一些. 在今年会议上发生的新意外是批评者的分量更重了. 斯坦福大学教授, 利率制定的“泰勒法则”的创造者约翰•泰勒指出, 美联储在过长的时间里维持过低的利率, 此举大错特错. 要是美联储遵循他的泰勒法则, 就会将联邦基金利率从2001年的1.75%升到2005年年中的5.25%, 而不是先将利率降到1%再缓缓升息. 根据泰勒教授的计算, 正统的利率路径能显著降低房地产增长速度. 他指出, 更早的紧缩能够”避免大部分房地产暴涨”. 以色列和巴西央行均对制止泡沫的政策表示赞同并质疑美联储的做法.

And well they might. The asymmetry in the Fed's thinking is obvious. If Mr Mishkin believes the Fed should anticipate the economic consequences of a deflating bubble, why should it not anticipate the consequences of an inflating one? If it is possible to spot excessive lending as the market climbs, how can it be so impossible to identify bubbles? Until this asymmetry is corrected, frequent bubbles seem a sure thing. And the Fed's efforts to exude a cowboy confidence will be undermined by the suspicion that it is dealing with the consequences of its own errors.
他们是对的. 美联储的思维明显地自相矛盾. 如果米什金先生相信美联储可以预计泡沫破裂带来的经济后果, 为什么就不能预计泡沫膨胀带来的后果呢? 如果在市场繁荣时遏制过度借贷是可能的, 为什么确认泡沫就变得不可能呢? 除非解决这种自相矛盾, 否则频繁的泡沫是不可避免的. 并且, 美联储散布牛仔式信心的努力将大打折扣, 因为人们质疑他们正在与自身错误所导致的后果作斗争.